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Peruvian democracy has been battered by recent power struggles between President Alberto
Fujimori and Gen. Nicolas de Bari Hermoza Rios, head of the Peruvian military. While the president
downplayed the disagreements, the political opposition and the press questioned whether the
president or the military is running the country. At the same time, Congress has been paralyzed
since mid-December because of maneuvers by members of the governing Cambio 90-Nueva
Mayoria to allow the president to run for a third term.
The friction between Fujimori and Gen. Hermoza erupted on the anniversary of the December
1996 takeover of the Japanese ambassador's residence by Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac
Amaru rebels. Hermoza had recently published a book describing his role in carrying out the
commando raid that ended the hostage crisis in April 1997. In the rescue operation, one hostage, two
commandos, and all 14 MRTA rebels were killed (see NotiSur, 01/10/97, 01/31/97, 02/07/97, 04/25/97).
Fujimori criticized the book in an interview published on the anniversary of the MRTA takeover.
The daily newspaper El Comercio quoted Fujimori as saying Hermoza participated in neither the
design nor the strategy of the rescue but only in executing the operation. "I know perfectly how the
operation was developed," Fujimori said. "I designed it." Military stage show of support for Gen.
Hermoza Military and police officers closed ranks behind Hermoza, going out of their way to praise
him publicly.
Military commanders from around the country arrived unexpectedly in Lima, where they attended
a public ceremony along with the ministers of defense and interior and Vladimiro Montesinos, de
facto head of the Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN). "You, general, personify and represent
the army of Peru," said Gen. Carlos Pergamino to Hermoza during the televised ceremony. "Any
attempt to discredit your accomplishments is an offense to our institution as a whole."
The move by the military set off rumors of a possible coup, but Fujimori once again demonstrated
his ability to operate under stress. With typical brinkmanship, he ordered the generals to "return
immediately to your respective command posts and carry out the responsibilities to which you are
assigned." After the crisis subsided, Fujimori emphasized his authority over the armed forces, but
said that for the time being no changes would be made in the military hierarchy. "What has been
demonstrated is the armed forces' subordination to civilian power," said Prime Minister Alberto
Pandolfi. Many Peruvians disagreed, however.
As the influence of Hermoza and Montesinos has increased, so have calls for change. Following
the latest incident, opposition politicians denounced the "civilian-military clique" that runs the
country, and they called on Fujimori to retire Hermoza, replace Montesinos, and reorganize the
military high command to make it subordinate to civilian authority. "Fujimori has wanted to replace
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Hermoza since 1994, and it has become clear that he does not have the power to do it," said Enrique
Obando, an expert on Peru's armed forces. Fernando Rospigliosi, a political analyst and expert
on the military's role within Peru's civilian governments, said that in 1994 Fujimori sent an envoy
to Hermoza to tell him he had been named defense minister and to congratulate him. "Hermoza
laughed and rejected the job," said Rospigliosi. "He knows better than anyone that the defense
minister has no power and the head of the armed forces does." Commentators warned that the
problems only appear to have been smoothed over. "
The friction between Fujimori and Hermoza could have caused, and can still cause, the breakup of
the democratic order," said an editorial in the financial daily Sintesis. Heavy-handed lawmaking sets
off congressional crisis The feud between Fujimori and the military "is only the tip of the iceberg,"
said Federico Salazar. "It clearly indicates the precarious nature of the balance of powers."
The democratic order is also threatened by Fujimori's other power struggles. The legislature has
been paralyzed since mid-December, when the Cambio 90-Nuevo Mayoria legislators passed a law
in a late-night session to allow Fujimori to create temporary judges. The opposition said the new
law will allow Fujimori to handpick the judges who will oversee future elections, which could help
him win an unprecedented third term of office in 2000. The government insisted the legislation is
intended to ease the judicial backlog, not boost Fujimori's re-election chances.
The action by Fujimori's backers in Congress so outraged opposition legislators that they disrupted
Congress with placards and hung banners calling the legislation "the fraudulent-election law."
Congressional President Carlos Torres y Torres Lara then suspended full-chamber activity, and
pro-government deputies created a 30-member committee with ample lawmaking powers. But the
opposition has refused to sit on the specially-created committee, making the legislature effectively
inactive and holding up legislation on key bills. The president has called the opposition's tactics
"childish."
On Jan. 7, the opposition proposed a debate without interruption on the controversial "fraud law."
Alfonso Grados Bertorini, of the Union por el Peru (UPP), said if the majority accepts the minority
will agree to debate the pending bills before the current session ends on Jan. 31. The opposition
is also spearheading efforts to organize a referendum on a third term for the president. Alejandro
Santamaria, of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), said demonstrations against
any re-election efforts will continue even at the risk that the president might once again dissolve
Congress.

Opposition increasingly vocal but ineffective
Still, political analyst Mirko Lauer said the objections of the small, stubborn opposition are largely in
vain, because compliant pro-government parties simply rubber-stamp Fujimori's legislation. "From
one scandal to the next, the opposition just ends up pushed further into a corner, where it sits on a
tiny protest box, systematically sidelined so that it has no chance of bringing about any changes,"
Lauer said.
To most observers, each confrontation increases Fujimori's control over the other branches of
government as he prepares for his re-election bid. But his heavy-handed tactics have also created
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute
All rights reserved.

Page 2 of 3

LADB Article Id: 54926
ISSN: 1060-4189

enemies and left him isolated, which in turn has strengthened the hand of Montesinos, the most
unpopular public figure in Peru and the third member with Fujimori and Hermoza of Peru's uneasy
triumvirate. The erosion of the other branches of civil power has further weakened the nation's
fragile democracy. Foreign investors have frequently named the weakness of democratic institutions
as the main drawback to the country's otherwise attractive investment conditions. (Source: El Nuevo
Herald, 12/17/97; Associated Press, 12/20/97, 12/22/97; Spanish news service EFE, 12/15/97, 12/23/97,
01/06/98; Reuter, 12/22/97, 12/23/97, 01/06/98; Notimex, 12/17/97, 01/07/97
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